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An Economist Listens to Serial
Peter Siegelman add thanks to Anne, Ian, and Ann.
Virtually nothing about what makes Serial so compelling has much to do with economics. But the central
question of the series—the guilt or innocence of Adnan Syed—does connect with a powerful and
important branch of economic theory dealing with asymmetries of information, instances where one
party knows something the other doesn’t.1 For example, policyholders may know more about their
riskiness than their insurers do; criminal defendants may know more about their guilt or innocence than
the state does; and so on. Of course, people often have reasons to conceal or distort their private
information, so the challenge posed by so-called “screening” models is to devise rules, incentives or
institutions that induce self-interested actors to reveal what they know.
Could Serial itself, by its very existence, serve as such a truth-inducing mechanism? Sarah Koenig
seemed to toy with this idea when—at the very end of episode 12, as she was wrapping up the series—
she wondered “. . . why on earth would a guilty man agree to let me do this story, unless he was cocky
to the point of delusion.”2 Put slightly differently, can we learn anything about Adnan Syed’s guilt or
innocence from the fact that (before the investigation began) Syed gave permission for his case to be
investigated and his story to be told?
Consider the decision of a rational3 individual who has been convicted of a crime, and is approached by
an unbiased journalist and asked for permission to have his case investigated for a podcast. The
individual knows whether he has committed the crime for which he was convicted. Assume further that
refusing to grant permission is costless: unless the podcast is produced, nobody will ever learn that the

1

For a brilliant application of these ideas to a problem in criminal law, see Daniel J. Seidmann and Alex Stein, The
Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV.
430 (2000) and Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Response to Critics, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 101
(2008) (right to silence encourages guilty defendants to remain silent, enhancing evidentiary value of innocent
defendants’ testimony). See also, Peter T. Leeson, Ordeals, 55 J. L. & ECON. 691 (2012) (explaining how trial by
ordeal in medieval criminal law could have served as mechanism for accurate revelation of private information).
And on a lighter note, see MARSHALL JEVONS, MURDER AT THE MARGIN (2014) (fictional economist turns detective and
uses economic principles to solve a murder).
2

Serial podcast, Transcript at p, 286 (available at
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0Bw8FBdDlWKodbjJNRmlHeWdMSjg/view),
visited March 14, 2016. A little earlier, Koenig mentioned that Adnan agreed to have DNA testing done on physical
evidence that was never tested at the time he was convicted. He says:
It’s just anything about my case, I want to know it. I don’t want anyone to be able to say ‘well he
didn’t want to know so boom, we went and found out.’ No, I want to know. So I called . . . and
said ‘Look . . . I wanted you to test things. I’m the one that asked for this.’
Id. at p. 285. I’m assuming that Adnan was in a position to authorize or grant permission for the podcast,
in just the way he was empowered to authorize the DNA testing: neither could have occurred without his
consent. If that’s not true, then the analysis below would look quite different: even a guilty subject might
find it in his interest to participate in an investigation that was going to take place anyway, with or
without his permission.
3
If we are not willing to assume a rational actor, almost anything is possible. For example, the subject might have
an inflated sense of his own invulnerability, and authorize an investigation despite being guilty, because he
believes he could never be caught: he might be “cocky to the point of delusion.” Or perhaps, though guilty, he
might authorize an investigation because he unconsciously wants to be caught.

subject was approached for permission, or that he refused to grant it, so no adverse inferences could
ever be drawn from a refusal.4
Let’s start with the easiest case, a perfect investigation that is guaranteed to uncover the true outcome:
without error, it reveals whether the defendant was guilty or innocent. Under these unrealistic
circumstances, the defendant’s choice of whether to participate should be clear. A guilty subject will
refuse to permit an investigation, since it would inevitably confirm his guilt. By contrast, an innocent
subject will always want to cooperate. In this world, the mere offer to conduct an investigation induces
perfect “separation” between the two types of defendants. All and only the innocent will agree to
cooperate; the guilty will refuse. Even without actually undertaking the investigation, therefore, we can
motivate the subject to part with his private information about his own guilt.5
What would happen in a more realistic world where the investigation is not guaranteed to uncover the
truth? Let’s imagine that whether the subject is guilty or innocent, he believes that the investigation will
reveal the true state of affairs with probability p, while with probability (1-p), it will reveal evidence that
is mildly consistent with the opposite of the truth.6 Figure 1 illustrates. At stage 1 of the game, “Nature”
chooses the defendant’s type (guilty or innocent), which the defendant knows, but which nobody else
does. At stage 2, the investigator offers to conduct an investigation (without, of course, knowing the
defendant’s type). At stage 3, the defendant either rejects the offer (and suffers no consequences) or
accepts it. A guilty defendant who accepts expects to receive weakly exculpatory (erroneous) evidence
with probability (1-p) and strongly inculpatory (correct) evidence with probability p. An innocent
defendant expects to receive weakly inculpatory (erroneous) evidence with probability (1-p) and
strongly exculpatory (correct) evidence with probability p. If either type of defendant accepts, the
investigation then occurs, and at stage 4, its outcome is revealed. The ultimate consequences of the
investigation are given by some function, V(evidence), which captures the value to the defendant of
whatever evidence is uncovered.
In this setup, the guilty defendant can choose to reject the offer to investigate, or can accept and face a
p chance of getting a bad outcome and a (1-p) chance of getting a weakly good outcome. It follows that

4

This is somewhat analogous to the right to remain silent: the trier of fact is supposedly not allowed to draw any
adverse inferences from the defendant’s refusal to take the stand. (Of course, as Lisa Flynn, one of the jurors in
the Syed trial made clear when interviewed for the podcast, Adnan Syed’s failure to take the stand in his own
defense did apparently count against him, despite an instruction to the contrary by the judge. Serial Podcast
Transcript, Episode 8 at p. 191 (visited March 14, 2016).
5
For the purposes of determining the truth, it might therefore seem as if no investigation need ever be done.
However, astute readers will recognize that never doing any investigations cannot be an equilibrium. If
investigations are never actually undertaken, the guilty would always have an incentive to grant permission for an
investigation so as to pool with the innocent, thereby breaking the separating equilibrium we just constructed.
Fortunately, the independent desire of investigators to tell a good story (apart from demonstrating the subject’s
guilt or innocence) provides a motive for actually conducting some investigations, even though they are costly.
Such an extrinsic motive is not present, e.g., when insurance companies investigate possibly fraudulent claims. This
means that unless insurers can somehow pre-commit to auditing some fraction of claims, they cannot effectively
use the threat of an audit to deter fraud. See, Pierre Picard, Auditing Claims in Insurance Markets With Fraud: The
Credibility Issue 63 J. PUBL. ECON 27 (1996).
6
As Leeson, supra n. 1, points out, what matters is the defendant’s subjective belief about p, not the fact of the
matter. Leeson’s claim is that superstitious beliefs about the accuracy of trial by ordeal—based on the notion that
God intervenes to determine the outcome of the trial—were sufficient to generate accurate outcomes from
ordeals, even if the underlying beliefs were wrong.

he should accept the offer to investigate if and only if the expected payoff from refusing to permit the
investigation (0) is less than the payoff from allowing it:
(1)

0 < p×V(Strongly Inculpatory) + (1-p)×V(Weakly Exculpatory).

If the subject thinks the investigation will be accurate (p is large), he expects it to generate strongly
inculpatory evidence with a high probability (and weakly exculpatory evidence with a conversely low
probability).7 Of course, what really matters is not the evidence itself, but the real world outcome the
evidence gives rise to.8 For example, someone serving a life sentence without possibility of parole would
probably not be harmed by new inculpatory evidence, because he would have very little to lose by its
revelation. Assuming he believes p to be reasonably large, a guilty defendant who has something to lose
from unfavorable evidence would be better off refusing to allow an investigation, because the expected
value on the right hand side of (1) is negative.
What about an innocent defendant? He, too, should accept the offer to investigate if and only if the
expected payoff from refusing to grant permission is less than that from permitting the investigation:
(2)

0 < p×V(Strongly Exculpatory) + (1-p)×V(Weakly Inculpatory).

If he believes the investigation is accurate (large p), the innocent defendant expects to get favorable
information with a high probability and weakly unfavorable information with a low probability. The
expected payoff from granting permission to investigate will tend to be positive if the defendant can
make good use of the favorable information (by obtaining a new trial, a pardon, or parole) and if mildly
negative information is unlikely to be very harmful.
Under these conditions, the innocent defendant should want to allow the investigation to proceed,
while the guilty defendant shouldn’t. And if he believes the investigation will actually be carried out, the
guilty defendant will not find it in his interests to authorize an investigation just to make it look as if he’s
innocent. That strategy is unavailing because the actual investigation will likely reveal his guilt.
Have we learned anything from all this? Adnan Syed is serving a life sentence, but not one for which
parole is technically impossible.9 This means that he does have at least something to lose by the
7

The belief that p is large seems reasonable: in fact, the reporters on Serial went to great lengths and considerable
expense to track down evidence, interview witnesses, retrace timelines, and so on.
8
In episode 6, Adnan states
Error! Main Document Only.To be honest with you, it kinda—I feel like I want to shoot myself, if I
hear someone else say, “I don’t think he did it cause you’re a nice guy, Adnan.” . . . I hear people
say that to me over the years and it just drives me crazy. . . . I would rather someone say, “Adnan, I
think you’re a jerk, you’re selfish, you know, you’re a crazy SOB, you should just stay in there for
the rest of your life except that I looked at your case and it looks, you know, like a little off. You
know like something’s not right.”
Serial Podcast Transcript, page 150. The model doesn’t explicitly account for reputation or honor, one of
many important omissions.
9

Brief of Adnan Syed, Appellant, v. State of Maryland, Appellee., 2002 WL 32510997 (Md.App.), 1. According to
one source, however, “release on parole for a life sentence is almost nonexistent and requires approval by the
governor. In the past decade, no one serving a life sentence has been paroled in Maryland.”
http://www.takepart.com/article/2014/12/17/serial-op-ed, visited March 13, 2016.

revelation of any inculpatory evidence, even if we entirely discount questions of honor or reputation.
And of course, he would certainly have at least something to gain from new exculpatory evidence. Thus,
the mere fact that Adnan agreed to allow the investigation into his case is at least suggestive that he is
actually innocent. Another possibility is that Adnan believed that the accuracy of the investigation, p,
was very low. If so, even if he were guilty, agreeing to participate would have a low probability of
revealing that fact, and a modest chance of uncovering some (weakly) exculpatory evidence.
It would be ironic if Serial, which conspicuously failed to reach a definitive conclusion about Adnan’s
guilt or innocence, could take us to the truth indirectly, just by virtue of Adnan’s decision to allow the
podcast to go forward. That would clearly be too strong an inference in this case. But in reaching a
judgment about Adnan’s guilt, we do need to appreciate that the evidence revealed by Serial’s
investigation includes the fact that Adnan authorized the investigation in the first place. If he did so
rationally, the fact of his agreement should itself count as a piece of evidence in his favor.

Guilty

Innocent

Offer to
investigate
Reject

Accept
Investigation
Occurs

Guilty Innocent

p

0

 Strongly 

V 
 Inculpatory 

(1-p)

(1-p)
Weakly


V 
 Exculpatory 

pV(SI) + (1-p)V(WE) < 0?

Weakly


V 
 Inculpatory 

p
 Strongly


V 
 Exculpatory 

(1-p)V(WI) + p(SE) > 0?

Figure 1: Investigation Game

